Illustration: Liu Rui/GT
When the US administration seeks to redefine America's relationship with the world, including Europe, the latter's response has been one of damage limitation. It has desperately sought to persuade the US to continue supporting the war against Russia in Ukraine, while, in order to mollify Washington, the European members of NATO have unanimously agreed to increase their defence expenditure to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. The EU has failed to take any serious initiative on tariffs, despite having had over three months to do so. Meanwhile the US administration is once more on the warpath, threatening a tariff increase of 30 percent on August 1.
The lack of initiative points to a malaise in the European Union. A significant global shift is underway and yet the EU, in some fundamental way, has been unable to respond. It has feet of clay. This demands an explanation. How can this be? The first reason lies in the fact that ever since 1945, Europe has been considered the "junior partner" of the US. It may have been described as the Atlantic Alliance, but it has been a very unequal alliance. Apart from on European matters, it has engaged in very little independent thinking. Its view of the world is derived from America. The habit is so deeply entrenched that it defines how Europe thinks about the world.
A second problem is the European Union itself. Unlike a nation-state, it is a construct, a product of a bureaucratic and committee-like mentality. Brussels, the capital of the EU, captures the problem perfectly. It works by a process of endless negotiations and compromises. The EU is congenitally incapable of thinking out of the box about the future of global relations and addressing the overarching choices that face Europe. A more likely candidate for this task are nation-states, except they too lack the necessary skills because for so long such matters have been regarded as the responsibility of Brussels.
A third problem is that Europe's decline has been even more pronounced than that of the US. Its proportion of global GDP, according to purchasing power, fell from 16.5 percent in 2000 to 13.4 percent last year. It has steadily lost ground in the high-tech industries and has no tech giants. Since the 2008 financial crisis, its economies have been relatively stagnant as have living standards. There is a pervasive sense of demoralization and dissatisfaction, combined with a deep disillusionment in the political, economic, and cultural elites. The most dramatic illustration of Europe's fall from grace is that its most important manufacturing industry, automobiles, has been overtaken by Chinese companies. Europe has been unable to compete with either the US or China and is now very much third in the world. It is hardly surprising that Europe feels on the back foot and in decline.
Given these problems, Europe is not in a good place to think creatively and proactively about its own future as a major player on the global stage. The contrast with the US and China could not be starker. It was the US, with Trump 1.0 and then, crucially, Trump 2.0, that came to the view that the postwar order was no longer aligned with America's interests and needed to be reinvented. China, for its part, has been constantly reinventing itself ever since the beginning of the reform and opening-up period in 1978.
It was China alone, furthermore, that had the strength and self-confidence to stand up to US administration and force it to retreat in its attempt to unilaterally and arbitrarily impose tariffs on the country. In contrast, Europe has failed to offer any such initiative, remaining passive and divided in the face of US blandishments, awaiting its fate with a sense of impotence and resignation.
There was some optimism that, in the face of US all-round assault, including on Europe, that the latter might seek a stronger relationship with China. Regrettably, Europe is still showing the same kind of negativity toward China on climate change, EVs, and trade relations as previously.
The UK's position on China, although not a member of the EU, is a good exemplar of where things are in Europe. The Starmer government has sought a more positive relationship with China, but at the same time agreed covertly to restrict its economic relationship with China in the tariff agreement it reached with the US. Only Spain has argued for a more markedly positive attitude toward China.
If the Europe doesn't move toward a more equidistant position between the US and China, or simply a more positive relationship with China, but seeks a continuing close relationship with the US, on terms very much dictated by the US, this will mean a far more one-sided and unequal than was previously the case.
The author is a visiting professor at the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and a senior fellow at the China Institute, Fudan University. Follow him on X @martjacques. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn